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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAURA E. STARLEY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 970055-CA 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT 
APPELLEE'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this court is conferred pursuant to the provisions of Sections 78-2a-3(g) 
and 78-2-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended and Rule 3 of the Utah rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This action involved the appeal of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree of Divorce signed and entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on October 18, 1993. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on January 
21, 1997. A timely cross appeal was filed on February 4, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Has the Appellant sufficiently marshalled the evidence in support of her appeal 
in attacking the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
2) Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law sufficient and supported by 
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the clear weight of the evidence to support the court's distribution of property 
and the classification of property as marital or premarital. 
3) Was the evidence sufficient to support the court's distribution of property. 
4) Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law sufficient and supported by 
the clear weight of the evidence in setting forth Appellee's income. 
5) Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law sufficient in setting forth the 
trial court's alimony award. 
6) Did the court err in awarding durational alimony. 
7) Did the court err in refusing to award additional child support in the form of 
private school tuition and nanny expenses. 
8) Did the court err in awarding Appellant her attorneys fees at trial and should 
Appellee be awarded his fees on appeal. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The standard for review for issues one (1) through seven (7) is that this Court of 
Appeals: 
accords the trial court considerable discretion in adjusting the financial interest of 
divorced parties and, thus the court's "actions are entitled to a presumption of 
validity." Allredv. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The trial court's 
determination "will not be upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary or [this court] determine(s) that the court has abused its discretion." 
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Ostler v. Oster, 
789 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The standard of review on issue eight (8) above (attorney's fees) is: 
Trial court's have broad discretion to award attorneys fees, however, the award "must 
be based on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need for attorney's fees, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested award. 
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
A party may be awarded fees on appeal if they were awarded fees at trial and they 
substantially prevail on appeal. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal involves a divorce case. The parties were married on May 9, 1987 and 
divorced by a bifurcated Decree of Divorce entered in February 1995. The Complaint for 
Divorce was filed on November 8, 1994. The trial took place on November 16, and 17. and 
December 28, and 29, 1995 upon request of the trial court at the conclusion of trial, each of 
the parties filed submissions summarizing their respective positions as to the equitable 
distribution of the marital assets and liabilities, taking into account separate inherited or pre-
marital property claims. (See Plaintiff's Submission re: Defendant's Proposed Property 
Distribution Set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 25, Dated February 9, 1996, R. at 221, 231, 
addendum A; Defendant's submission re: Defendant's Proposed Property Distribution set forth 
in Defendant's Exhibit 25, dated February 21, 1996, R. at 232-53, addendum B). The trial 
court issued it's Memorandum Decision deciding the case on November 12, 1996. (R. at 275-
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96, addendum C). Supplemental Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce were entered on December 27, 1996. (R. at 298-316A, 
addendum D, and R. at 317-329, addendum E). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellee/Cross Appellant, Steven D. McDowell, seeks the following relief in 
connection with this appeal: 
1) An order affirming the trial court's distribution of property in all respects. 
2) An order affirming the trial court's classification of property as premarital or 
marital in all respects. 
3) An order affirming the trial court's award of alimony of $1,000 per month for 
one year, to terminate December 31, 1997. 
4) An order affirming the transitional alimony. 
5) An order affirming the trial court's refusal to award additional child support in 
the form of private school tuition or nanny expenses. 
6) An order reversing the trial court's award of S15,000 attorneys fees to the 
Appellant. 
7) An order awarding the Appellee/Cross Appellant his fees for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on May 9, 1987. They have two minor children, Brittany 
Jane McDowell, born September 5, 1989 and Megan Elizabeth McDowell, born June 16, 
1992. The Petitioner was age 41 and the Respondent was age 48 at the time of the divorce. 
(R. at 299-300) 
At the time of the marriage Respondent/Appellee ("Mr. McDowell") worked as a sales 
representative for Woolrich Clothing Company where his employment required him to travel 
approximately six months of every year. During his best year at Woolrich, he earned gross 
income of approximately $130,000, before subtraction of necessary business expenses. (Tr. at 
219). He also received rents and other income from real estate investments, promissory notes 
and contracts he bought and sold as he had done prior to the parties marriage. (Tr. at 219). 
Mr. McDowell lost his employment with Woolrich during the marriage. Due to his 
inability to find comparable employment, he then devoted himself full-time to his real estate 
business, including the purchase and sale of real property, notes and contracts. (Tr. at 161-
162). 
The Petitioner/Appellant, Laura E. Starley ("Ms. Starley") was employed at Nordstrom 
during the course of the marriage. She was regional merchandise manager at the time of trial. 
According to the most recent tax return available for the trial court, Ms. Starley earned 
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$68,000 in wages, and an additional $7,000 contributed to her IRA and other retirement 
accounts. (Tr. at 164). 
The parties 1994 income tax return showed that they had a total gross income of 
approximately $332,000. That amount included a one-time buy out of Woolrich stock which 
was acquired by Mr. McDowell prior to marriage. It also included some capital gains, and 
approximately $68,000 attributable to Ms. Starley's employment. Mr. McDowell's wages 
from Woolrich were approximately $76,000. The remainder of the parties' total income was 
attributable to the Woolrich termination and sales of other premarital property. (Tr. at pp. 
314-321, Defendant's Exhibit 16). 
Mr. McDowell bought and sold real property throughout the marriage. At the time of 
trial, the parties jointly owned a marital residence located on Oakridge Drive in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. This residence was purchased prior to the marriage. However, the parties jointly 
signed on the underlying mortgage obligation. Mr. McDowell also owned a house located on 
Ontario in Park City, Utah, which he purchased two and one-half years before marriage; a 
house located on Sycamore Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah, in which Mr. McDowell resided 
and which he purchased one year prior to the marriage; a duplex located on Park Avenue in 
Park City, Utah, which he purchased six months prior to the marriage; a house located on 
Blair in Salt Lake City, Utah, which was purchased after the parties separation; plus three 
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other parcels of real estate properties. Except for the marital residence on Oakridge Drive, the 
Petitioner was not on the title of any real estate owned by Mr. McDowell. (Tr. at 249). 
Mr. McDowell additionally held in his sole name, notes and other real estate contracts 
which had a value of more than $300,000, a portion of which he acquired prior to the 
marriage, or which were purchased by him during the marriage with his pre-marital funds. 
(R. at 310, 311). 
As a part pf the equitable distribution, the trial court awarded Ms. Starley her 
retirement accourits and the marital residence located on Oakridge Drive. (R. at 308). She 
was ordered to pay the first mortgage on that residence and he, Mr. McDowell, was required 
to pay the second mortgage equity line obligation. All of the other real properties, notes, and 
contracts, including all of Mr. McDowell's pre-marital assets and his retirement accounts, 
were awarded to Mr. McDowell. (R. at 305). The court found that Mr. McDowell's West 
One IRA account iiad a net pre-marital value worth approximately $106,387. (R. at 307). 
Mr. McDowell brought approximately $450,000 in assets into the marriage. (R. at 304). The 
court also found he received an inheritance from his mother in 1989 of approximately 
$55,000, for a total pre-marital and inherited amount of $505,000 as his separate property. 
(R. at 304). The court found that the Petitioner brought certain assets into the marriage which 
she was awarded, and other property traced or which was not carefully valued. (R. at 304). 
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She inherited $33,000 from her mother's estate in November of 1989, and received a $30,000 
personal injury settlement, the details of which were never fully disclosed. (R. at 304). 
The court found that the property division of $379,811 to Petitioner and $893,942 to be 
fair and equitable taking into account the parties needs and the Respondent's business. The 
award traced the pre-marital or inherited assets to the party of origin. The award recognized 
the pre-marital contributions, and the personal and business characteristics of the assets. (R. 
at 304). The following chart outlines the court's division of assets in a clear and readable 
manner: 
Petitioner 
Personal Property $ 
Jewelry 
Country Club 
Smith Barney 
(pre-marital) 
Nordstorm IRA 
(pre-marital) 
17,000 
17,500 
5,950 
7,367 
(7,367) 
6,885 
(6,885) 
Respondent 
Personal Property 
Jewelry 
West One IRA 
(pre-marital) 
Woolrich 
Sycamore (pre-marifc 
Ontario (pre-n 
Nordstrom Stock Option 25,000 
Nordstrom PS Plus 45,930 
Nordstrom Profit Sharing 70.000 
Park Ave(pre-marital) 
Adams 
Blair 
$ 15,500 
2,300 
141,627 
(106,387) 
20,185 
(50,000) 
(121,000) 
(137,500) 
32,800 
19,271 
Oakridge 208.000 
TOTAL (minus pre-marital) $389,380 
Meadow 
McDowell 
Blakenship 
Jones 
Lot 
Rodriguez 
Sargetis 
Ivision 
Brown 
Hardle 
Wilmott 
Alvey 
Washburn 
Overy 
Evans 
Daher 
Umana 
Sherrick 
Hoyt 
0 
4,000 
0 
10,067 
14,420 
15,485 
2,200 
18,326 
20,615 
5,962 
0 
21,452 
28,208 
47,851 
30,437 
2,981 
10,789 
18,600 
14,500 
Flores 4,403 
Seif 10,025 
Eyre 11,055 
Stock 9,947 
(subtotal) $301,237 
Baker (pre-marital) (12,030) 
Pippas/Baker 
(pre-marital) (60,000) 
Chidaster 
(pre-marital) 20,782 
TOTAL (minus pre-marital) $369,860 
The total estate value was approximately $1,273,753. When the Respondent's pre-
marital portion of $450,000 and his inheritance of $55,000 is deducted from that amount, the 
marital estate totals $768,753. After the Petitioner's pre-marital personal injury settlement of 
$30,000, and her inheritance of $33,000, are separated from the marital estate, then the 
remaining estate is valued at $705,753. That amount divided by two equals $352,876.50 to be 
awarded to each party. The Petitioner was awarded $379,811, which totals more than one-half 
of her share of the marital estate, without taking into account that her personal injury 
settlement and inheritance was not carefully valued or traced by Gee to existing marital 
property. As such, the Petitioner was in fact awarded more than one-half of the marital estate 
to be divided. 
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The trial court further ordered Mr. McDowell to pay alimony in the sum of $1,000 per 
month to terminate December 31, 1997. (R. at 320). The Respondent was also ordered to 
pay child support in the amount of $882 per month for the parties two minor children. (R. at 
318). Mr. McDowell had previously paid alimony to Ms. Starley pursuant to a temporary 
order, totaling $1,000 per month from December 1, 1994 to November 1995. (R. at 77). The 
total alimony award spanned three (3) years. Alimony was based on Ms. Starley's gross 
monthly income of $4,622 per month and Mr. McDowell's gross monthly income of $6,667 
per month, for a difference between the parties two gross monthly incomes of $2,045. Of that 
$2,045, Mr. McDowell was required to pay Ms. Starley, $1,882, in child support and alimony 
leaving Mr. McDowell only $163 to pay all other expenses, including taxes. 
The court ordered Mr. McDowell to pay $15,000 of Ms. Starley's attorney's fees, as 
well as the equity line of credit against the Oakridge Drive residence awarded to Ms. Starley, 
and income taxes due for 1995. (R. at 321, 325). 
The trial court ordered Ms. Starley to assume and pay debt totaling $27,315, most of 
which the court found was incurred by her following the separation of the parties and the trial 
court's Temporary Orders. (R. at 305). The Respondent was ordered to assume and pay 
debts totaling $56,682, most of which was incurred during the marriage. (R. at 321). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
Ms. Starley has failed in her requirement to marshall all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings related to the distribution of property, Mr. McDowell's income, 
alimony, payment of nanny and private school expenses, and attorney's fees for Ms. Starley. 
She has further failed to demonstrate that the evidence in support of those findings is 
insufficient. Likewise Ms. Starley has failed to demonstrate that the findings on these issues 
are clearly erroneous. Consequently her appeal on the issue of equitable distribution should be 
denied. 
Point II 
The Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court contains the requisite elements and 
details required in connection with a property distribution award because they distinguish pre-
marital and separate property from marital property as well as the accumulations on that 
separate pre-marital property. Accordingly the property distribution award must be affirmed. 
Point III 
The Findings of Fact entered by the trial court contain the requisite elements and 
details to support the award of alimony. They reflect that the trial court considered the; 
1. financial conditions and needs of Ms. Starley; 
2. ability of Ms. Starley to produce a sufficient income for herself; 
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3. ability of Mr. McDowell to provide support to Ms. Starley. 
There is more than ample credible evidence in the record to support each of the 
findings in this regard. The trial court did not err in making the alimony award being 
challenged by Ms, Starley, and it's ruling should therefore be upheld. 
Point IV 
The trial court did not err in awarding durational adjustments to Ms. Starley's alimony 
award. The record is clear as to the ample credible evidence that the alimony was transitional 
only, and that Ms!. Starley has the ability to meet her own needs after the transition period. 
Accordingly the award of durational alimony should be affirmed. 
Point V 
The trial court did not err in failing to require Mr. McDowell to pay one-half of the 
costs of nanny and private school for the parties children. The evidence demonstrates that the 
nanny was a luxury rather than a necessary expense in relation to ordinary daycare expenses. 
Nor did the trial court err in failing to require Mr. McDowell to pay one-half the cost of 
private school tuition for the children; the evidence clearly demonstrates that there was not an 
agreement between the parties for private school, the children had not historically attended 
private school, and the children were of extremely young age. Accordingly the trial court's 
denial of nanny and private school tuition should be affirmed. 
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Point VI 
The trial court erred in awarding Ms. Starley attorney's fees given the substantial 
amount of property she was awarded and her ability to meet her own needs. The court 
considered the evidence as to the parties respective incomes, expenses, assets and liabilities, as 
well as evidence relating to the number of hours expended, total amount of fees and costs, and 
the reasonableness of the amounts charged Ms. Starley for legal services. The court also had 
before it evidence of the debts, and made an unequal distribution of the debts by requiring Mr. 
McDowell to pay approximately double the debt allocated to Ms. Starley. From that evidence, 
however, the trial court incorrectly found that Mr. McDowell had the ability to pay an 
additional $15,000 in attorney's fees. Therefore the court's award of attorney's fees at trial 
should be reversed. 
Point VII 
Ms. Starley should not be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in the appeal. Ms. 
Starley has appealed nearly every issue of the trial court's ruling, with the exception of the 
award of her attorney's fees. Many of her requests are frivolous, and have no basis in law or 
equity, such as the payment of nanny expenses and private school tuition for the parties 
children. Therefore, it would be inequitable to award Ms. Starley her attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
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Point VIII 
As the prevailing party at trial, Mr. McDowell is entitled to be awarded all of his 
attorney's fees and costs related to this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED IT'S 
CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN ORDERS OF EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THE FINDINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THAT AWARD. 
Utah law requires that the appealing party must marshall all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings to demonstrate that those findings are an abuse of discretion or are 
clearly erroneous. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Ms. 
Starley has failed to do so. 
In divorce actions the trial court is vested with considerable and broad discretion in 
fashioning fair and equitable remedies for the parties on the issues of distribution of property, 
support and attorney's fees. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5; See Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 
134-35 (Utah 1987). The trial court's decisions will not be disturbed by the appellate court 
unless the appealing party demonstrates that the decision of the trial court is clearly unjust, or 
that the trial court clearly abused it's discretion. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
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In order to meet her burden, it is a prerequisite that Ms. Starley must first marshall all 
of the evidence which supports the trial court's reasoning and decisions and then demonstrate 
that that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, is insufficient to 
support the finding or is clearly erroneous. As noted in Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(UtahCt. App. 1989): 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's factual findings, an appellant 
must marshall all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. . . or that it's 
findings are otherwise clearly erroneous. The finding is clearly erroneous 
when, even though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
Id. at 88. The Court of Appeals "does not consider evidence de novo, so the mere fact that 
[it] might reach a different result than the trial court on the same evidence does not justify 
setting aside the trial court's findings." Id. at 88 (citations omitted). 
Ms. Starley's brief and accompanying arguments fail to satisfy the "marshalling" 
requirements of Schindler, and on this basis alone her appeal of the trial court's rulings on the 
distribution of property, support, and attorney's fees issues is fatally defective. Ms. Starley's 
brief is wholly lacking in specifying evidence both in support of and contrary to her position. 
She does not point this court to any evidence whatsoever that would support this court's 
findings. Her failure to indicate to this court instances in the record or in the transcripts of 
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trial, where there is substantial evidence in support of the findings, indicates her failure to 
marshall the evidence. 
In the following arguments, Mr. McDowell will point to specific instances where Ms. 
Starley failed to marshall the evidence. Each specific instance relates to each separate issue, 
and will indicate to the court that the findings are based on the substantial weight of the 
credible evidence, and that Ms. Starley's failure to show that those findings are clearly 
erroneous warrants this court denying her requests on appeal. 
It appears that Ms. Starley is operating under the misconception that what she 
presented as evidence to the trial court in support of her position below should automatically 
be treated as fact. In this case, the record reflects that the trial court accepted evidence from 
both parties, weighed that evidence and then found facts upon which to fashion remedies that 
are fair and equitable to both parties on the issues of distribution of property, the amount of 
support, and the duration of support. It is not err of a trial court to discount or give little 
weight to evidence offered by one side or the other at trial. Gardner v. Madsen, 949 P.2d 
785, 790. In fact it is the trial court's prerogative and duty to analyze conflicting evidence in 
the process of determining the ultimate facts. Id. Therefore, based upon Ms. Starley's failure 
to marshall the evidence and show that the findings are contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence, her appeal must be dismissed. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN REGARDING ITS 
ORDERS DISTRIBUTING MARITAL ASSETS OR IN ITS ENTRY OF 
FINDINGS RELATED TO THAT DISTRIBUTION. 
The most hotly contested issue in this trial was the characterization of property as 
marital or pre-marital. Utah case law specifically permits an unequal division of property 
when one party has brought significant assets into a marriage, or inherited assets during the 
marriage, and has kept those assets separate. See Bun v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 
1982); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980); Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978); 
Henderson v. Henderson, 576 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1978). 
Utah case law consistently holds that individuals are entitled to the return of their pre-
marital property, gifts or inheritances, absent certain circumstances. See Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988); Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Those circumstances include, "(1) whether the other spouse 
has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection 
of that property; or (2) the property has been consumed or its identit} lost through co-mingling 
or exchanges, or whether the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the 
other spouse." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304. 308. The Mortensen court went on to 
specifically state that the court need not divide the property classified as marital with strict 
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mathematical equality, however the court should not divide the property in such a way that a 
party would "lose the benefit of his or her gift or inheritance by the trial court's automatically 
or arbitrally awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the remaining property which was 
acquired by their joint effort to offset the gifts or inheritance." Id. 
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), the court listed certain factors to be 
considered in making an equitable property division. The Burke court determined that "pre-
marital property, gifts and inheritance may be viewed as separate property and, in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that each party retain that separate property brought to the 
marriage." Id. at 135. However, the Burke court also determined that the trial court should 
review factors such as: "(1) the amount and kind of property to be divided: (2) whether the 
property was acquired before or during the marriage; (3) the source of the property; (4) the 
health of the parties; (5) the parties standard of living, respective financial needs and earning 
capacity; (6) the duration of the marriage; (7) the children of the marriage; (8) the parties ages 
at the time of marriage and divorce; (9) what the parties gave up by the marriage; and (10) the 
necessary relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony and child support 
to be awarded." Id. It seems clear from the trial court's Memorandum Decision, that if took 
into account all of the factors listed in Mortensen and Burke in making the property division in 
this case. 
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The trial court awarded property it found to have a net value of $893,942 to Mr. 
McDowell. (R. at 304). Of that $893,942, $512,301 was directly attributable to or 
accumulated from, pre-marital assets. Of the $379,811 awarded to Ms. Starley, $14,252 was 
characterized as pre-marital. (R. at 307, 308). Petitioner argues that she was not given credit 
for her pre-marital property such as an inheritance of $33,000 or her personal injury 
settlement of $30,000. However, Ms. Starley herself testified that she lost that money. (Tr. 
at 68). 
"In entering equitable orders to divide the marital estate, the trial court has 
considerable discretion, [which will not be disturbed on appeal], as long as the trial court 
exercises this discretion in harmony with the standards set by the appellate courts." Roberts v. 
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The trial court's findings regarding the 
characterization of property as pre-marital or marital were sufficient and were supported by 
the evidence. 
Furthermore, Ms. Starley cannot come back to the court now to contest findings on 
appeal which she did not challenge at the trial level. Speaking directly to this issue, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985): 
Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for findings on 
the specific value of the assets. In this case, however, the wife's attorney prepared the 
inadequate findings of fact she challenges on appeal and the conclusions of law and 
decree of divorce all of which the court entered without alteration. Counsel for the 
wife made no motion to have the trial court amend the findings to include values. See 
UTAH R.CIV.P 52(b). The wife cannot come now, albeit through new counsel, and 
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complain of her own failure to include specific property values in the findings if fact. 
She has waived the claim. 
Id. at 1074-1075. Therefore, Ms. Starley's complaint about the Findings of Fact is too late. 
As such, the Findings must be upheld as entered by the trial court. 
The trial court's award of Mr. McDowell's pre-marital property to him was an 
appropriate use of the court's discretion. "While a trial court has discretion to award inherited 
property [to the non-inheriting spouse] such property vas well as it is appreciated value, is 
generally regarded as separate from the marital estate and hence is left with the receiving 
spouse in a property division incident to divorce."' Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 
598, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Burt v. Bun, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). Each of the trial court's findings regarding the pre-marital property are set forth 
below: 
4721 Sycamore Drive: 
Defendant has occupied a home located at 4721 Sycamore Drive. It was 
appraised in September 1995 to have a fair market value of $196,000. 
Defendant placed the value thereon of $213,000. The mortgage thereon was in 
the amount of $147,874. Defendant liquidated pre-marital Woolrich stock to 
acquire said property. The court finds the reasonable value of the equity therein 
to be $50,000, which should be awarded to the Defendant and the property 
should be awarded to Respondent to the debt thereon, which Respondent should 
be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from. (R. at 309)(emphasis added). 
42 Ontario Canyon Street: 
Defendant acquired the property located at 42 Ontario Canyon Street, Park 
City, Utah, in 1985 prior to the marriage. The court finds that the value of the 
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property to be $240,000 as of the end of the year 1995. The remaining balance 
due on the first mortgage at the time of trial was just over $24,000, while the 
remaining balance due on the second mortgage was approximately $95,000. 
The second mortgage proceeds were utilized in obtaining notes and real estate 
which are part of the investment business operated by Defendant. The net 
equity therein of $121,000 should be awarded to Defendant subject to the first 
and second mortgages, which Respondent should pay and hold Petitioner 
harmless from. (R. at 309)(emphasis added). 
1140 Park Avenue, Park City, Utah: 
Defendant acquired the property located at 1140 Park Avenue, Park City, Utah, 
just prior to the marriage of the parties. An appraisal of the property as of 
October 1995 indicated that the property had a fair market value of $240,000. 
Defendant valued the property at $200,000 by making several adjustments to 
value. Although the court recognizes merit to the adjustments, the real estate 
market during the intervening year was rapidly appreciating, as testified to by 
Defendant. Accordingly, the court finds the fair market value of the property to 
be $225,000. The mortgage thereon near the end of 1995 was approximately 
$87,500. The equity therein of $137,500 should be awarded to Defendant, 
subject to the mortgage thereon, which he should pay and hold Petitioner 
harmless from. (R. at 309, 310)(emphasis added). 
Pippas Note: 
Defendant contends that a note in the face amount of $60,000, dated July 20, 
1995, from William W. Pippas is a pre-marital asset. Plaintiff contends this 
asset to be marital. This divorce case was filed November 8, 1994. Troy 
Young paid off the remaining balance of his obligation on July 14, 1995, in the 
amount of $68,422.87, which was used to secure the Pippas note. The $60,000 
Pippas note should be awarded to the Defendant. (R. at 311; Tr. at p. 224, p. 
398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403)(emphasis added). 
Chidaster Note: 
Finding 43. The parties disagree as to whether the Chidaster note of 
May 4, 1988 is marital or not. Defendant contends the Christensen (Chidaster) 
obligation was created from sale proceeds from the Edgeware property he held 
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prior to the marriage. The amount due there on of $20,782 should be awarded 
to Defendant. (R. at 312; Tr. at p. 403, 404, 405, 406)(emphasis added). 
Ms. Starley argues that she has presented extensive evidence regarding her 
contributions to this separate property and commingling of marital monies, however, she fails 
to point to that evidence to support her argument and completely fails to indicate the contrary 
evidence. Ms. Starley also provided scant evidence as to any contribution she made to the 
maintenance and management of the rental properties. (Tr. at 34-35). Mr. McDowell's 
contrary evidence included testimony from the parties accountant, Mr. William Page, who 
testified that Respondent's pre-marital properties and separate assets generates positive cash 
flow to maintain those separate properties. (Tr. 329-331; Defendant's Exhibit 31). 
As Mr. Page testified, there was more than adequate separate property to provide for 
all expenses related to the rental properties without using any marital income or funds. As 
such, the court reached the obvious conclusion that marital funds were not used to supplement 
the rental income in supporting Mr. McDowell's properties. 
The Appellant, by merely rearguing her position, has not only failed to marshall the 
evidence, but has completely overlooked the trial court's broad discretion making its equitable 
distribution award based on its advantaged position to access the credibility of witnesses. 
Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), The fact that the court gives 
more credence to one witness than another, does not demonstrate that the court abused its 
discretion. Id. 
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It is true that Respondent borrowed against the marital residence, with an equity line, 
to assist in the purchase of various rental properties. However, in finding that those rental 
properties should be awarded to Respondent, the trial court also ordered him to be obligated 
on that second mortgage equity line, forever holding the Petitioner harmless therefrom. (R. at 
305). 
The court's Findings of Fact were detailed in delineating which property was pre-
marital property and separate from the estate, and which property was marital property. The 
ultimate division of property awarded the Petitioner $389,380 in value, including the value the 
court placed on the personal property and on her jewelry. The Respondent, conversely, was 
awarded $369,860 of the marital property, which included the value the court placed on the 
personal property awarded to Respondent and his jewelry. The discrepancy in the remaining 
property was based upon the court's findings that the remaining assets were the Respondent's 
pre-marital or separate assets, or assets which had a significant pre-marital component to 
which the Petitioner had not contributed. (R. at 304). 
The Petitioner argues that she received an inheritance during the marriage, and that she 
also received a personal injury settlement. (Tr. at 44, 66-69). However, the Petitioner 
testified that those monies had been expended, or invested in assets in which Petitioner 
received the ultimate benefit. Specifically, Petitioner testified that $10,000 of the money went 
towards the parties wedding and another $10,000 went towards home improvements of the 
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home she was awarded, free and clear of any interest in the Respondent. (Tr. at p. 30-31). 
Furthermore, contrary to the assertions of the Petitioner, the Respondent was not specifically 
given credit for his inheritance in the distribution of property. The difference between the 
parties' property distribution awards was based upon the appreciation of separate property 
from the time of marriage to the time of divorce. The award of this difference to her Mr. 
McDowell is fully supported by Utah law. See ejg, Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). "Inherited or donated property, as well as it's appreciated value, is generally 
regarded as separate from the marital estate and hence is left with the receiving spouse in a 
property division instant to divorce." 
The holding in Burt is also helpful to the analysis of this case because there, as here, 
the Appellant argued that the Respondent's separate property changed form during the 
marriage, thereby changing it's character from separate property to marital property. The 
Burt court clearly stated that what is essential is "not whether the mere form of property has 
changed, but whether it has lost it's 'identity' as separate property." See Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d at 1169. See also, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Where the 
court specifically stated that, "conversion from one investment medium to another does not, by 
itself, destroy the integrity of the segregation." See Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169. 
The facts in Burt are strikingly similar to the trial evidence here. Mr. McDowell took 
some separate property and transferred it into new assets or similar assets with new individuals 
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but in his sole name. Under the Burt analysis, those transfers did not change the character of 
Mr. McDowell's property as separate. Other properties of Mr. McDowell were clearly pre-
marital assets and remained pre-marital because they were never co-mingled in any way. 
Petitioner does not argue that certain properties of Mr. McDowell were not owned 
prior to the marriage. Those were the properties located on Ontario in Park City, Utah; 
Sycamore in Salt Lake City, Utah; Park Avenue in Park City, Utah; the Baker Notes; the 
Pippas Note; and the Chidaster Note. What Petitioner argues is that these assets should be 
included in the marital estate because she contributed to their maintenance or enhancement. 
However the trial court, in specifically finding that these assets were pre-marital, impliedly 
discredited the Petitioner's testimony in this regard, and found them to be pre-marital and 
therefore separate assets of Mr. McDowell. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
the trial court was not necessarily compelled to accept such self-interested testimony 
whole cloth and make such an award; and in the absent of patent or clear abuse of 
discretion, this court will not disturb his findings and judgment.Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890, 899 (Utah 1996) quoting Beckstrom wBeckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 
523-24 (Utah 1978). 
Id. at 1172. In fact, what the trial court did here was follow Burt v. Burt closely, by awarding 
each of the parties that separate property still in existence at the time of the divorce, and 
roughly 50% of the marital property. Id. The trial court specifically found that certain 
properties of the Petitioner's were pre-marital, including her Smith Barney account and her 
Nordstrom IRA, and awarded those to her. Therefore, the Petitioner's unhappiness with those 
26 
results does not make it contrary to the law and nor does it make the court's ruling an abuse of 
discretion. The court followed the case law, and, being in the best position to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, reached a conclusion that it specifically found was fair and 
equitable. (R. at 309). 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S DIVISION OF PROPERTY WAS FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The trial court's division of property, and classification of marital and pre-marital 
property was equitable given all the facts and circumstances of this case. Mr. McDowell 
brought over $500,000 into the marriage. Ms. Starley brought approximately $50,000 into the 
marriage. The each left the marriage with approximately $300,000 more than they had when 
they were married if which, is a fair and equitable distribution of property. 
Petitioner argues that because Mr. McDowell was awarded income producing 
properties, she should have been given a compensating award. Without those income 
producing assets Mr. McDowell would have no ability to pay child support or alimony. 
Notwithstanding that fact, Ms. Starley was awarded compensating property in being awarded 
the entire equity in the marital residence, as well as all of her Nordstrom retirement plan and 
stock option plans which totaled more than $125,000. Furthermore, Ms. Starley did not 
dispute that the real properties awarded to Respondent should be awarded to him. (Tr. at p. 
53; PL's Ex. 18). 
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It is clear from examining Plaintiffs Exhibit 18, that she believes that she is entitled to 
her pre-marital assets, but that Respondent is not entitled to his. The court, in equity, returned 
to the Petitioner her pre-marital property still in existence, and also returned to the Respondent 
his pre-marital property. The trial court specifically valued each piece of property, including 
the personal property and jewelry awarded to each party, consistent with the requirement in 
Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Not only did the parties agree to 
the value of the bulk of the marital property, the court made specific findings regarding the 
value of each other piece of property after viewing all of the evidence. 
Ms. Star ley argues that notwithstanding the values, that all of Respondent's property 
was commingled. She argues that a primary example of commingling property is 42 Ontario 
in Park City, Utah. Ms. Starley contends that this asset was purchased a "short time" before 
the marriage. However the trial evidence is clear that this property was purchased in 
December 1985, a year and a half before the parties May 9, 1987 wedding. This year and a 
half was not a "short time" before the parties marriage. 
Ms. Starley also testified that marital funds were used to augment the cash flow, reduce 
the mortgage and make improvements. (Tr. at 35). However, the parties accountant, a 
neutral third party, testified that this was not true, and that Mr. McDowell's separate funds 
from his inheritance and from the sale of certain pre-marital property, supplemented the cash 
flow thereby freeing all marital funds for marital purposes. (Tr. at 513). The court, being in 
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the best position to review and weigh the evidence, did so and found that that property was 
pre-marital and should be returned to Mr. McDowell. 
Ms. Starley then argues that the second mortgage on the Ontario property was not 
marital obligation, but was Mr. McDowell's separate obligation because he used that second 
mortgage in his real estate business. The court, consistent with Ms. Starley's position, 
ordered Mr. McDowell to be solely responsible for all mortgages on the Ontario property and 
hold Ms. Starley harmless therefrom. 
Ms. Starley argues that the court never made a finding as to whether or not Ontario 
was pre-marital property, however, the court's Memorandum Decision and the Findings 
drafted therefrom, made it clear that this was pre-marital property when they state, "that 
Defendant acquired the property located at 42 Ontario Canyon Street, Park City, Utah, in 
1985 prior to the marriage." (R. at 290; Mem. Dec. at <[36; R. at 309, Supp. Findings of Fact 
at f m)(emphasis added). 
Ms. Starley's argument confuses what is a clear finding by the trial court. She argues 
that the court determined that the Adams property was marital and the court still awarded to 
Mr. McDowell the entire 532,800 of that equity. However, Ms. Starley does not contend that 
the property located at Oakridge was marital and that she should be awarded the entire 
$208,000 in equity in that property. Her reasoning is inconsistent. The court, in an overall 
review of the findings, makes it entirely clear that the court took into account which properties 
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were pre-marital, and then divided the remaining marital property. The court based its 
decision on agreements between the parties regarding the values of those properties and how 
those properties should be divided. 
In her brief, Ms. Starley makes a similar argument regarding the award of Notes in the 
total sum of $301,000 to Mr. McDowell without taking into account the ultimate division of 
the property. As previously stated, the court made a similar finding that Ms. Starley should 
be entitled to her entire Nordstrom profit sharing plan in the sum of S70,000. In VI Oil 
Company v. Department of Environmental Quality, 904 P. 2d 214, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
this court stated: 
In reviewing the record as a whole, we consider not only the evidence supporting the 
board's findings but also the evidence negating them. However, this court will not 
substitute a judgment as between two reasonably conflicting \iews, even though we 
may have come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de novo 
review.' 
Ms. Starley complains about those findings which are contrary to her desires but, by 
applying inconsistent reasoning, does not similarly complain about findings which support her 
position. Each specific finding need not contain a detailed explanation as to how the court 
arrived at it's decision. What the findings must do is support the ultimate decision when 
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viewed in light of the whole record before the court. Nelson v. Board of Equalization of Salt 
Lake County, 934 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Utah 1997). 
The Petitioner's argument regarding the Pippas Note overlooks all of the facts and 
testimony upon which the court based it's decision. Mr. McDowell had a pre-marital property 
which he sold to the Packs in December 1996, five months prior to the marriage. (Tr. at 
400). Mr. McDowell held a note receivable on that property. (Tr. at 400). The Packs then 
sold the property to Troy Young and Mr. McDowell agreed to carry the contract and note on 
that property. (Tr. at 401-402). Mr. Young paid the balance of the note in the amount of 
$68,422.87, which Mr. McDowell deposited into a separate account. (Tr. at 403). From that 
separate, and never co-mingled account, Mr. McDowell withdrew money to make a loan to 
Pippas to enable Pippas to purchase a replacement property. (Tr. at 403-404). 
It is true, as Ms. Starley states in her brief, that Mr. McDowell only had $33,000 in 
equity on the property from which the Pippas note evolved when the parties married. 
However, through payments made to reduce the mortgage and from an increase in property 
values, Mr. McDowell was able to increase the value on that separate asset. It is in this way 
that Mr. McDowell made his money throughout the marriage, and it is to his credit that he 
was able to increase the value of piece of property. That fact does not change the fact that this 
was separate property which was kept separate throughout the marriage making the passive 
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increase in that property also separate property. See Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 
1987). 
Reviewing the record as a whole, and the findings as set forth, it is clear that the court 
took a careful look at all of the property, returned to each party the pre-marital property in 
existence at the time the parties divorced and divided the remaining property, approximately 
$390,000 to Ms. Starley and approximately $370,000 to Mr. McDowell. As such, the court's 
findings and it's decision should be affirmed by this court as it is consistent with Utah 
statutory and case law regarding the equitable division of property. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING MR. McDOWELL'S 
INCOME SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The trial court's Findings of Facts regarding the Mr. McDowell's income should be 
affirmed as that finding is supported by the clear weight of the evidence. The Finding of Fact 
regarding Mr. McDowell's income is as follows: 
6. Employment and Income of Defendant. Defendant is 48 years old and 
works as an investor. He invests in real estate, notes, and contracts. His stock-
in-trade is an inventory of parcels of real estate, notes, and contracts. The court 
feels that it is appropriate to be conservative in finding current income of 
defendant, as it has been in finding plaintiff's current income. Accordingly, the 
court has used plaintiff's 1995 actual earnings, yielding lower than usual income 
for plaintiff. 
With respect to defendant's 1995 income, no meaningful accounting was 
available. Defendant estimated his 1995 income to be in the range of $70,000 
to $98,000. In traditional business accounting, accounting for purchases and 
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tracking inventory of goods for the accounting period yields an accurate cost of 
goods sold number, which is a significant and important business expense. 
Defendant's inventory is made up of parcels of real property, notes, and 
contracts. No costs of goods sold analysis has been presented to the court for 
any tax period on defendant's investment business. Without such an analysis, it 
is difficult to determine defendant's income. 
William Page, a certified public accountant with over twenty-five years 
experience, evaluated defendant's investment income. Mr. Page had done no 
accounting work for the parties during 1995. He analyzed defendant's 1994 
income and expenses and based thereon, projected defendant's 1995 estimated 
annual income to be $76,081 or $6,340 per month. While the court is not 
entirely satisfied with the approach taken, it is nonetheless the best evidence of 
defendant's current income. As a self-employed individual, defendant is in a 
position to directly benefit through business expenses allowable for tax 
purposes, such as entertainment and travel expenses. For that reason, the court 
finds that, for purposes of calculating child support, defendant's current 
adjusted gross income is $80,000 per year, or $6,667 per month. Although 
defendant's cash flow for a particular period may be significantly higher, the 
court has taken into account the necessity of plowing back in to the properties 
proceeds from the sale of properties. If defendant fails to do that in a skillful 
and well-managed way, the business he is in will soon fail. 
(R. at 300-301). This finding is supported by the credible weight of the evidence. (Tr. at 
314-320). 
In her brief, Ms. Starley has taken gross income from the parties income tax returns to 
indicate that the court's findings are inaccurate. The figures as presented by Petitioner do not 
reflect "adjusted gross" income as stated by Petitioner, but rather reflect "gross gross" income 
prior to the subtraction of reasonable and necessary business expenses. Furthermore, the 
incomes stated by Ms. Starley include both parties wages (which Mr. McDowell no longer 
receives having lost his job with Woolrich), and non-recurring income to the parties which 
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includes capital gains realized from sales, sales from motor homes, stock sales of pre-marital 
stock, and some retirement buy-outs. (Tr. at p. 316-319). 
Ms. Starley's brief is particularly unhelpful regarding income because it completely 
fails to tell the court what Mr. McDowell's reasonable and necessary business expenses would 
be. Defendant's Exhibit 16, which was received by the court, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as exhibit A, indicates exactly what Mr. McDowell's 1994 income was. This actually 
reflects Mr. McDowell's income after counting for reasonable and necessary business 
expenses and after subtracting both parties wages and non-recurring income events. 
Ms. Starley refers to Petitioner's Exhibit 29 to show Mr. McDowell's gross income. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 29 was not offered nor received in evidence, and therefore is not part of 
the record for this court to consider. Furthermore, as previously stated, Ms. Starley's 
assessment of Mr. McDowell's income does not take into account all of Mr. McDowell's 
expenses that he must pay in order to keep his business running, including the payment of 
interest expense. Mr. McDowell explained clearly in his testimony that he purchases 
properties, carries the underlying note and then sells the properties on contract so individuals 
then pay him. He still has the obligation on the underlying property, and must pay the interest 
expense on that property, thereby reducing his income accordingly. (Tr. at p. 170-171). 
Contrary to the assertions of Ms. Starley, Mr. Page, the accountant, did make an 
explanation for the $54,000 in interest expense he claimed should be deducted from Mr. 
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McDowell's income. Specifically, on page 318 of the transcript, line 9, Mr. Page explains the 
interest deduction from IRS form 1040. As previously explained, that interest deduction was 
paid by Mr. McDowell for underlying notes he carried on properties on which he was holding 
contracts. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(4)(a), specifically allows for the deduction from gross 
income for those business expenses reasonable and necessary to continue operation of the 
business. If Mr. McDowell did not carry the underlying interest payments on notes, he would 
not be able to sell those notes and receive a higher payment thereon. That would decrease his 
ability to operate his business in any form. Therefore, the expenses as outlined by Mr. 
McDowell and his accountant are clearly a reasonable and necessary business expenses. 
Ms. Starley refers to Defendant's Exhibit 18, however, that exhibit was not admitted at 
trial and is not part of the record. That exhibit was specifically excluded by the trial court 
because it did not specify the federal income tax reductions from the parties income. The 
revised exhibit which was admitted into evidence, was Defendant's Exhibit 31, a copy of 
which is attached as exhibit B. It indicates that, for the periods of January 1, 1987 through 
December 31, 1994, Mr. McDowell from his separate business and funds, had a total income 
of $751,477.58. During that same time period, Mr. McDowell had expenses of $608,710.63, 
for an average of $142,766.95. As Mr. Page testified at trial, this sum included $55,000 in 
inheritance which was non-recurring, and $15,000 worth of non-recurring sample sales, plus 
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additional income from the sale of motor homes. (Tr. at 502). With the non-recurring income 
subtracted from the $142,766.95 Mr. McDowell's average income for that eight year period is 
$58,966.94. The court did not rely on Mr. McDowell's income averaged over the eight year 
period, but rather looked at current earnings as required by Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(5)(b). 
See Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court's findings were 
detailed regarding Mr. McDowell's income, and the record is replete with testimony regarding 
Mr. McDowell's income. Mr. Page, the accountant, testified twice, regarding that income. 
This court must uphold the findings made by the trial court regarding Mr. McDowell's 
income. Those findings are adequate and the record is replete with examples specifically 
identifying Mr. McDowell's income. Furthermore, Ms. Starley's counsel drafted those 
findings, and it is contrary to Utah law to allow Ms. Starley to now come back, at this late 
date, and complain of "her own failure to include specific values in the Findings of Fact. She 
has waived the claim." Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1985)("Normally we would 
grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for findings on the specific value of the 
assets. In this case, however, the wife's attorney prepared the inadequate Findings of Fact, 
she challenges on appeal, and the Conclusions of the Law and Decree of Divorce, all of which 
the court entered without alteration. Counsel for wife made no motion to have the trial court 
amend the Findings to include values."). See UTAH R.CIV.P. 52(b). 
POINT V 
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THE COURTS FINDINGS AS TO ALIMONY ARE SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT ITS AWARD. 
The Court's Findings of Fact regarding the award of alimony should be affirmed. As 
stated above, it was Ms. Starleyfs failure to make a post-trial motion to amend those findings 
to make them more detailed. Ms. Starley's counsel prepared the findings of which she now 
complains, and which the court signed without alteration. As such, she has waived her right 
to now come back and complain about the findings. See Jones v. Jones, 702 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985). In addition, Ms. Starley has totally failed to marshall the evidence in support of the 
findings. Therefore, her appeal in this regard should be dismissed. See Breinholt v. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In any award of alimony the court must make findings on three factors. Those are: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
2. The ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and 
3. The ability of the husband to provide support. 
Id. at 1075 (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)); See also Gramme v. 
Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 
1980). 
The trial court's finding as to Ms. Starley's income is set out in its Finding of Fact No. 
5, and Ms. Starley concedes that that finding was adequate. (R. at 299-300). The court also 
made a finding regarding Mr. McDowell's income. That finding was Finding of Fact No. 6. 
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(R. at 300-301). Each of the parties filed Financial Declarations indicating what their incomes 
were after payment of taxes, enabling the court to review each parties gross and net incomes. 
(R. at 127, 139). There was also extensive testimony on Ms. Starley's monthly living 
expenses. She testified at great length as to her Exhibit 12, setting out about her monthly 
expenses. On cross-examination, Ms. Starley admitted that the car expense she included of 
$581.50 was for a car in Mr. McDowell's possession and for which he was paying. (Tr. at 
pp. 114-115). Ms. Starley also admitted that $100 in monthly yard maintenance was only 
incurred during the summer and fall months. (Tr. at p. 108). Also included in her monthly 
expenses was the price of health insurance for the nanny, whom she now no longer requires 
due to the school age of both minor children. She also testified that her monthly medical and 
dental expenses where high because they were partially covered by insurance, and because 
they are treated and incur the expense twice annually rather than monthly as her exhibit set 
out. (Tr. at p. 111-112). Ms. Starley also testified that the quarterly food fee at Country Club 
is only used during the summer months. (Tr. at p. 116;. Ms. Starley also testified that the 
incidentals for grooming were a generalized maximum expense and that although it costs her 
$80 to get her hair dyed, it was not an ongoing expense. (Tr. at p. 18, "if I get my hair dyed, 
it is $80"). The court, being in the best position to review the evidence, clearly reviewed Ms. 
Starley's expenses, and reduced those he felt were overstated such as yard maintenance, house 
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cleaning, entertainment, incidentals and grooming, a car expense and child care, half of which 
Mr. McDowell would pay. 
The court also had available to it Mr. McDowell's monthly living expenses in Mr. 
McDowell's Financial Declaration. (R. at 127). The court, being in the best position to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses and access the expenses, made an alimony award that fit the 
parties needs and abilities to pay. It is clear that "under our case law, 'trial courts are given 
primary responsibility for making determinations of fact' because trial judges are 'in the best 
position to access the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a 
whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record.'" Richard 
Barton Enter, 's Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 382 (Utah 1996), quoting, State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). 
The trial court, in making it's findings of fact, and after judging Ms. Starley's 
credibility, determined that her expenses were on their face, incredible. This is most likely 
because her expenses included a $500 car payment which she did not pay, a $1,050 child care 
expense, of which the Respondent paid half, residence maintenance, yard maintenance, and 
house cleaning of a combined total of $400 per month, incidentals and grooming for hair cuts 
of $165 per month, and a family insurance expense of $247, of which Mr. McDowell paid 
half, and a medical and dental expense of $200 per month, when that was the yearly average. 
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Mr. McDowell also testified, and submitted in Defendant's Exhibit 9, that his monthly 
expenses were $5,743. Those expenses include the home equity line on the Oakridge property 
which he was ordered to assume and pay, and the home equity line on Ontario which he was 
also ordered to assume and pay. Those monthly living expenses, plus the $882 in child 
support and $1,000 in alimony, which Mr. McDowell was ordered to pay, totaled a monthly 
obligation of $7,625, an amount which exceeds his monthly gross income by $958. The court 
also specifically found that it would be impossible for the parties to maintain the same standard 
of living they enjoyed during the marriage, as the income had to be divided between two 
households. (R. at 311). 
Because the uncontroverted evidence in the record supports the court's findings 
regarding alimony, the trial court's award should be affirmed. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DURATIONAL ALIMONY 
It is clear from the court's findings that the alimony award was intended to be a bridge 
to assist Ms. Starley in adjusting her income and expenses to a more realistic average. See 
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In addition to the transitional alimony award, the court ordered Mr. McDowell to pay 
more than double the debt that Ms. Starley was ordered to pay. This is significant given the 
fact that nearly every debt that Ms. Starley incurred was post-separation debt. However, the 
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court's finding that "under the 'for better or worse' contract of the parties" the court found 
those debts to be marital. (R. at 305). 
The court noted the difference in property awarded to each party and the need of the 
Petitioner to adjust her circumstances. The court also noted the unequal award of assets, 
however, the court, was aware of the substantial amount of assets awarded to the Petitioner 
which would enable her to meet her monthly living expenses. (R, at 287-289). 
Most importantly, this is a marriage of short duration and Mr. McDowell paid alimony 
throughout the parties separation. Overall, Mr. McDowell paid $1,000 per month for a period 
of three years. The one year of alimony awarded subsequent to the trial, was more than 
sufficient to enable Ms. Starley to "adjust her circumstances." (R. at 303). 
There is substantial authority for durational alimony not only in Utah, but in her sister 
states. See Galant v. Galant, 945 P.2d 795, 801 (Alaska 1997) ("reorientation alimony is 
essentially transitional and may be awarded for brief periods. . ."); Devila v. Devila, 908 P.2d 
1025, 1027 (Alaska 1995)("the court abused it's discretion in awarding reorientation alimony 
of more than one years duration."); Rabie v. Ogaki. 860 P.2d 785 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1993)(limited duration of alimony is appropriate where the recipient has substantial job skills 
and its a marriage of relatively short duration); Musgrove v. Musgrove, 821 P.2d 1366, 1370 
(Alaska 1991)("rehabilitative alimony in contradistinction to permanent alimony, is an award 
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of spousal support of limited duration and for a specific purpose.")(quoting Larson v. Larson, 
661 P.2d 626, 632 n.4 (Alaska 1983)). 
Ms. Starley's cites Thronson v. Tlironson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) for the 
proposition that it is inappropriate to award durational alimony when there are no findings 
regarding the recipient's ability to meet those needs at the end of the duration. However, Ms. 
Starley failed to point out that in Thronson the Court of Appeals specifically found that Mr. 
Thronson had discretionan income which would continue from which to pay alimony. It was 
that finding, combined with the others, that justified an award of permanent alimony. Id. at 
435. There is no such finding in this case. All of the testimony at trial, including the exhibits 
presented, indicate that there is no discretionary income from which Mr. McDowell can pay a 
permanent alimony award to Ms. Starley. In making the court's findings regarding the parties 
respective incomes, the court specifically found that Ms. Starley had earned more money in 
the past, and the court was being conservative in it's assessment of her present income. (R. at 
300). In limiting alimony to one year, the court inherently ruled that Ms. Starley had the 
ability to, and in all likelihood would be, earning more money in future years thereby 
increasing her own ability to meet her future needs. The durational award also gave Ms. 
Starley a window in which to adjust her expenses to meet her income. Therefore, the court's 
findings regarding limited and durational alimony should be affirmed. 
42 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT AWARDING NANNY EXPENSES 
OR PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES. 
The trial court's refusal to award additional child support to Ms. Starley in the form of 
private school tuition and nanny expenses must be affirmed. Utah law requires the parties to 
pay child support based upon their combined gross monthly incomes. Application of the Child 
Support Guidelines is a rebuttable presumption. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(2)(a) (Supp. 
1994). Before the guidelines can be rebutted the court must make specific findings of fact as 
to why the presumption should not apply in that specific case. See Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 
955, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In Brooks v. Brooks, the wife petitioned the court to modify the child support 
obligation and to require the husband to pay one-half of private school tuition. The court on 
that case made a specific finding at trial that both parties wanted the children enrolled in 
private school. At the time of trial the court found there was no substantial material change of 
circumstances warranting a modification of the child support obligation. Id. at 959. 
However, the trial court went on to determine that Mr. Brooks should pay one-half of private 
school costs. On appeal, this Court determined that the trial court's award would double Mr. 
Brooks child support obligation. Id. This Court went on to discuss the fact to that other 
factors could be applied to rebut the child support guidelines such as special educational needs 
or health needs. The matter was remanded for additional findings either justifying an upward 
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increase in child support obligation or an order vacating all of past and future private school 
related expenses. Id. at 960. This Court determined that in order to maintain the award of 
private school expenses, the trial court must find special circumstances. 
In this case no such special circumstances exists in Brooks. The parties oldest child 
was attending Kids Campus, were she went for daycare and also attended pre-public school 
age kindergarten. This caused no disruption in the child's life, as she could attend 
kindergarten with the same individuals that she spent the day with for her regular daycare. 
Then, subsequent to the separation, Ms. Starley unilaterally enrolled the minor child in private 
school. There was no reason supporting Ms. Starley's decision to enroll the child in private 
school other than her explanation to the court that it was because the child would miss the 
deadline for entering first grade. (R. at 22-23). However, there is no e\idence whatsoe\er 
that Ms. Starley investigated special programs for advanced students, or the ability for a 
waiver of the deadline given her child's abilities. Furthermore, there is no family tradition, 
religion, past attendance at private school, or other legitimate reason which would warrant 
attendance at a private school given the parties limited income and ability to meet their needs 
and expenses upon divorce. See In re Marriage of Stern, 789 P.2d 807, 814 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1990). 
There was no essential reason for a nanny, and the matter is now moot. The Petitioner 
has changed her work schedule such that no nanny is required. Ms. Starley can now use 
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ordinary after school daycare given her change in work schedule, for which Mr. McDowell 
was ordered to pay one-half. 
As Mr. McDowell testified, given the necessity of the parties supporting two (2) 
households subsequent to the divorce, private school and a nanny are luxuries the parties can 
not afford. Mr. McDowell testified to these expenses as a luxury, and did not agree to there 
expenditure at trial and does not agree with their expenditure now. (Tr. at p. 433-34). 
Accordingly, the court's order that Mr. McDowell not pay additional child support in 
the form of private school and nanny, should be upheld. 
POINT VIII 
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD MS. STARLEY HER 
ATTORNEYS FEES AT TRIAL. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989), grants trial courts the authority to award attorney's 
fees in divorce actions. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 265 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
"The award, however, must be based on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need for 
attorney's fees, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
award." Id. 
Both parties submitted evidence of the fees that were incurred and the reasonableness 
of those fees. The court may also consider factors such as the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency, expertise and experience of the attorneys involved, and the result attained. See Bell 
v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In reviewing the case at hand, and 
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examining the result attained, it appears that Mr. McDowell substantially prevailed at trial, in 
that he was entitled to keep his pre-marital assets, something Ms. Star ley strongly resisted. 
Furthermore, the court did not make a finding about the Ms. Starley's ability to pay 
her own fees based upon the substantial assets she was awarded, including a retirement fund in 
the sum of $70,000. Based upon Ms. Starley's receipt of those assets, she had the ability to 
pay her own fees. Absent findings to the contrary, the court's award of attorney's fees at trial 
should be overturned. 
Mr. McDowell should be awarded his fees on appeal and Ms. Starley should be denied 
her fees on appeal. A party may be awarded fees on appeal if they were awarded fees at trial 
and they substantially prevail on appeal. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 
(UtahCt. App. 1994). 
Because it was an abuse of discretion to award Ms. Starley fees at trial, and because 
Ms. Starley should not prevail on appeal, Ms. Starley should not be awarded her attorney's 
fees in connection with the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Starley has failed in her obligation to marshall the evidence presented to the trial 
court on each issue, distribution of property, classification of property as marital or pre-
marital, calculation of Mr. McDowell's income, award of alimony, refusal to award nanny 
expenses and private school tuition expenses, and attorney's fees. Furthermore, Ms. Starley 
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has failed to demonstrate that the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial court's 
ultimate finding on each of those issues. Ms. Starley has also failed to demonstrate any error 
in law committed by the trial court. 
Ms. Starley's brief is simply an improper attempt to reargue evidence, including her 
request that her evidence is the evidence that the trial court should have concluded with fact. 
The trial court entered the requisite findings related to the parties respective ownership 
of property prior to and subsequent to the marriage, and the parties respective financial needs 
and their abilities and resources to provide for their respective ongoing support. As the same 
is related to alimony and attorney's fees. Furthermore, the court specifically made a finding 
that the year term of alimony would assist Ms. Starley in adjusting her circumstances making 
it clear that award was transitional. The record contains more than sufficient evidence to 
support each of the trial court's findings as it relates to all of the issues with the exception of 
the payment of attorney's fees. 
The court erred in awarding Ms. Starley her attorney's fees as it failed to take into 
account the income producing aspect of the property awarded to Ms. Starley including her 
stock options, her IRA, and her separate bank accounts. 
Mr. McDowell should be awarded all of the attorney's fees he incurred in connection 
with the appeal of this matter, the order granting Ms. Starley her attorney's fees at trial should 
be reversed, and she should similarly not receive attorney's fees for appeal. 
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Mr. McDowell respectfully requests this court grant him the relief he has requested as 
set out in this brief. 
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